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It is a rare pleasure to have the benefit of thoughtful comments
from so many outstanding colleagues.  I am glad that the article,
Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, was sufficiently
stimulating to warrant such careful attention and comment.
The commentators found several areas in which the new frame-
work and its explication introduced new and useful—or at least
thought-provoking—ideas.  I am grateful for the positive comments
that reinforce the contributions of the article, including those recog-
nizing that the framework provides:
• a taxonomy of instruments that recognizes a greater breadth of
policy instruments1 than most studies and provides insight into
the relation among the instruments;2
• a means to restructure the evaluation criteria that are commonly
applied to the instrument choice exercise into a cost-
minimization approach;3
• recognition that cost-minimization requires looking beyond cost-
of-compliance only,4 expanding the cost factors to include public
1. See Daniel H. Cole, Comment, Environmental Instrument Choice in a Second-Best
World:  A Comment on Professor Richards, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 285, 289 (2000);
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Comment, Evaluating Instruments of Environmental Policy: A Comment
on Professor Richards, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 389, 389, 397(2000); Robert M. Fried-
man et al., Comment, Environmental Policy Instrument Choice:  The Challenge of Competing
Goals, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 327, 331 (2000).
2. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 389.
3. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Comment, Goals, Instruments, and En-
vironmental Policy Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 297, 298, 307 (2000); Friedman et
al., supra note 1, at 331-32.
4. See Cole, supra note 1, at 289.
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finance impacts5 and costs of implementation;6
• insight into the important dimensions of instrument choice, par-
ticularly the degree to which various instruments vest control
over abatement production decisions;7
• explicit recognition of legal constraints on the range of instru-
ments available to policymakers;8
• insight into the duality relation between subsidies (price-based
payments) and contracts (quantity-based payments), a simple
observation that had been previously overlooked;9
• a structure for understanding the significance of several impor-
tant observations, including the “greater attractiveness of incen-
tive-based instruments where the range of technology options is
greatest;”10 the potential desirability of paying interest on saved
allowances;11 the relation between measurement costs and pri-
vate discretion;12 and who bears the burden of residual pollution
harm;13
• a means to use New Institutional Economics to provide new in-
sights into the importance of credible commitment in environ-
mental policy, and that the importance of credible commitment
is not uniform across all instruments;14 and
• an approach that could be extended to include natural resources
management.15
If positive comments reinforce the contribution of the article, the
criticisms help sharpen the analysis by focusing on potential im-
provements in the development of the framework.  For those I am
also grateful.
The critical comments fall into three categories:  (1) those related
to how the evaluation criteria were restructured as a constrained cost-
minimization approach; (2) those addressing the new taxonomy of
policy instruments; and (3) criticisms of the overall framework and its
5. See id. at 292; Friedman et al., supra note 1, at 332.
6. See Friedman et al., supra note 1, at 353-54.
7. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 307.
8. See id. at 315; Cole, supra note 1, at 290-92.
9. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 414.
10. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 1, at 297.
11. See id. at 298.
12. See id. at 297.
13. See Cole, supra note 1, at 290.
14. See id. at 293.
15. See Friedman et al., supra note 1, at 331.
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potential applicability.  Some of the comments stem, no doubt, from
my own imperfect exposition.  In these areas we have no fundamental
disagreements.  Other comments bring new insight to the issue and
will be incorporated in future work as the framework is refined and
applied to specific problems.  Finally, there are some comments that
reflect a fundamental disagreement between my own approach and
those of the commentators.  While it is impossible to reply exhaus-
tively to all the comments, I will attempt to respond to some of the
suggestions and criticisms in this brief note, even recognizing that
only over time will it be possible to fully address these issues.  The
next section of this response addresses comments falling in each of
the three categories listed above and tries to address them where pos-
sible.
II.  SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS
A.  The Constrained Cost-Minimization Criteria
Dr. Friedman, Ms. Downing, and Professor Gunn raise the pro-
vocative issue of whether it is appropriate to focus on cost-
minimization as the driving force in evaluating the merits of environ-
mental policy instruments.16  They advance as an alternative approach
a set of criteria arranged in three broad categories with nineteen
separate factors to consider.17  It is a detailed, if not exhaustive,18 list
of criteria that was first developed in a report Dr. Friedman managed
for the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment.19  Where other studies
have provided lists of instruments and evaluation criteria, the OTA
Report develops a true framework—a systematic way to think about
the relations among the instruments.
The contrast between the OTA approach and the cost-
minimization formulation proposed in my framework is marked.
Friedman, Downing, and Gunn have a list of criteria that explicitly
accommodates a wide range of priorities, giving primacy to none.
This has the advantage of clearly recognizing that “each decision-
maker or stakeholder may prefer a different instrument choice de-
16. See id. at 327-28, 332.
17. See id. at 332, 344-45 .
18. The list Friedman et al. provide does not include differential public finance impacts or
legal constraints.
19. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, REP. NO. OTA-ENV-634,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS—A USER’S GUIDE (1995) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
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pending on his or her values.”20  Not only does this help the decision-
maker evaluate instruments in light of his or her belief about the im-
portance of each criterion, it also “presents a way for those who seek
to promote a particular instrument for political or ideological pur-
poses to scope out the advantages and disadvantages of their choice,
given other stakeholders’ preferences.”21
In contrast, framing the evaluation process as a constrained cost-
minimization exercise provides the conceptual analog of the “reduced
form” approach to thinking about the criteria.  While it sacrifices de-
tail, it gains simplicity and aids conceptualization.  It more clearly
identifies the cost factors (cost-of-compliance or production costs, PC;
implementation costs, IC; and the public finance costs, TX) than a
simple list of criteria, and suggests that instrument choice requires
recognizing the tradeoffs among those costs.  It also accommodates,
in simple form, most of the factors listed in the OTA study and dem-
onstrates that they will constrain the degree to which cost-reductions,
defined broadly, can be achieved.  Moreover, the cost-minimization
approach invites further definition of those constraints where the de-
cision-maker or stakeholder believes they are important, without re-
quiring that detail at the outset.  Far from suggesting that “cost-
minimization is the only criterion that should guide the choice of pol-
icy instruments” as Professors Shapiro and Glicksman assert it does,22
it could just as well be argued that the framework actually gives pri-
macy to the political, legal, and efficacy considerations by making
them constraints.  Only after non-cost goals are satisfied can cost-
minimization take place.
The comments by Friedman, Downing, and Gunn and by Sha-
piro and Glicksman bring out one real weakness in framing the
evaluation criteria as a simple deterministic cost-minimization prob-
lem.23  It assumes that there is a clear environmental goal, a particular
amount of pollution abatement that must be achieved.  In contrast,
the OTA Report recognizes the fuzziness with which environmental
goals can be set.  The evaluation criterion “assurance of meeting
goals”24 acknowledges the uncertain performance of some instru-
ments and invites decision-makers to consider how important a well-
defined quantity target actually is.  In the new framework the issue of
20. See Friedman et al., supra note 1, at 327-28.
21. Id. at 328.
22. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 322.
23. See id. at 302; Friedman et al., supra note 1, at 322, 343, 345-47.
24. Friedman et al., supra note 1, at 344 (Table 2).
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uncertainty is recognized in the discussion comparing price-based and
quantity-based instruments, but it is not easily accommodated in the
cost-minimization approach, suggesting that additional attention is
needed to this aspect of the framework.
Mr. Keohane suggested that it would be better to view the cost-
minimization problem in explicitly dynamic terms.25  He offers what is
essentially a dynamic optimization expression, in which the integral of
the discounted stream of costs (PC, IC, and TX) over an infinite time
horizon is minimized, subject to meeting a trajectory of abatement
requirements and remaining within the feasible set of instruments, de-
fined by possibly changing constraints arising from politics, legal re-
quirements, and experience.  While I understand, and identify with,
Mr. Keohane’s appreciation of the beauty of a precisely stated for-
mulation, I do not accept the mathematical pedantry reflected in his
comments.  The simpler formulation is more accessible to a wider
range of colleagues—particularly practitioners—without sacrificing
recognition of the dynamic nature of the optimization.  The discus-
sions of existing evaluation criteria,26 technological innovation,27 in-
tertemporal flexibility,28 and adaptability of the transaction in the face
of uncertainty29 all reflect dynamic considerations in the cost-
minimization problem.  To these Mr. Keohane usefully adds several
important observations.  First, monitoring costs may change over time
as new technologies become available.30  Second, governance costs
may decline (or rise) as the regulator and regulated party each be-
come familiar with the other.31  Finally, political and legal constraints
may change as experience with the range of instruments increases.32
All of these observations can be understood even in the absence of an
unnecessarily complex—and to some important audiences, intimi-
dating—formulation of the constrained cost-minimization problem
that raises barriers between disciplines.
The treatment of the political and legal constraints raised objec-
tions from both Professor Cole and Professors Shapiro and
25. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 389, 391-394.
26. See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 226-230 (2000).
27. See id. at 255-56, 278-79.
28. See id. at 248-49.
29. See id. at 246, 260-65.
30. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 392.
31. See id. at 393-94.
32. See id. at 393.
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Glicksman.33  They do not object to the explicit inclusion of legal con-
straints; in fact, they gladly accept this extension of the criteria.34
Their reservation is in the details of the illustrations.  For example,
Cole objects that the restrictions on federal regulation of land use,
used as an example of a legal constraint, may have been better in-
cluded in the category of political constraints.35  He asserts, correctly,
that under an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress has the legal power, if not the political will, to further regu-
late land use.36  In contrast, Shapiro and Glicksman suggest that in the
post-Lopez37 wake, the federal government may be further limited in
its ability to intervene in land use issues.38   While I accept both of
these observations, they seem to miss the larger point: policy analysts
generally have not explicitly recognized that our legal system imposes
important constraints on the range of policy instruments for imple-
menting environmental policies.  This is reflected in the fact that none
of the descriptions of evaluation criteria, including the OTA Report,
mention legal constraints.  Perhaps the most important of these con-
straints is the prohibition on legislative entrenchment that limits the
ways in which the federal government can make credible commit-
ments.39
B.  The Policy Instrument Taxonomy
Many of the comments provide suggestions that will add signifi-
cantly to the taxonomy and will be simple to incorporate.  Mr. Keo-
hane, for example, correctly pointed out that there is no reason to
limit the scope of the analysis, or “locus of regulation,” to perform-
ance measures based on outputs of emissions or inputs to the pollut-
ing process.40  One achieves a more robust taxonomy of instruments
by recognizing the existence of ambient taxes and tradable allow-
ances.41  This observation can be carried even further.  Friedman,
Downing, and Gunn describe harm-based standards that “prescribe
the end results of regulatory compliance . . . based on health and envi-
33. See Cole, supra note 1, at 290, 292; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 298,314-322.
34. See Cole, supra note 1, at 290, 292-93; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 315.
35. See Cole, supra note 1, at 292.
36. See id.
37. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
38. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 318-320.
39. See Richards, supra note 26, at 276-78.
40. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 397-400, 413-14.
41. See id. at 398-400.
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ronmental effects.”42  These harm-based standards are “widely used,
primarily in combination with design standards.”43  It should also be
possible to expand the “locus of regulation” beyond the simple input
versus output dichotomy in analysis of the enterprise instruments.
For example, while subsidies can be applied to either the inputs or
outputs of the polluting process, they also can apply to mitigation of
the actual impacts of the environmental damage, for example restora-
tion projects.
At the same time it is possible to work in the other direction—up
the production stream.  Where there is a high degree of correlation
between production inputs, pollution outputs, and damages, it is en-
tirely possible to achieve a satisfactory result by targeting regulation
at a “pre-input” party.  For example, in the case of carbon dioxide
emissions, targeting coal mines, oil refineries, and natural gas dis-
tributors rather than fossil fuel consumers’ outputs might substan-
tially reduce the administrative burden (an element of implementa-
tion costs) relative to making actual emissions of carbon dioxide the
“locus of regulation.”44  In general, then, the input versus output di-
chotomy, like the command-and-control versus incentive-based in-
strument dichotomy,45 is narrow and can be usefully expanded to rec-
ognize the range of useful loci of regulation.
Professors Shapiro and Glicksman raise the question of whether
the instrument taxonomy might leave the reader with the mistaken
impression that performance standards are a typical hierarchical ar-
rangement, largely vesting discretion with the government regulator.46
That was not the intent of the article, although it may have been the
effect.  In fact, given that Shaprio and Glicksman refer to the “locus
of discretion” dimension of the taxonomy as dichotomous47 rather
than continuous raises the question of whether an important element
of the taxonomy was too easy to miss.  The important message here is
that there is a continuum of instruments from design (technology)
standards, to performance standards, to tradable allowances, to bank-
able tradable allowances.  Within this continuum there are a multi-
tude of adaptations that define the degree to which the regulator and
42. Friedman et al., supra note 1, at 338.
43. Id. at 334 (Table 1).
44. See Kenneth Richards, Integrating Science, Economics and Law into Policy: The Case
of Carbon Sequestration in Climate Change Policy 118-24 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Univ. of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
45. See Richards, supra note 26, at 224 & n. 9.
46. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 305-07.
47. See id. at 305.
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private parties share discretion.  They vary in the extent to which they
provide flexibility over how, where, and when polluters abate pollu-
tion.  Performance standards at least nominally provide more flexi-
bility than design standards, inasmuch as they accommodate multiple
technologies, but they do not provide flexibility to polluters with re-
spect to where or when abatement will occur.  Thus, performance
standards combine elements of the hierarchical and incentive-based
approaches.
Professors Barnett and Terrell also find fault with the taxonomy
because, in discussing the distribution of costs, it distinguishes be-
tween firms that pollute and the larger society that bears the pollu-
tion.  They observe that “firms are owned by people, they employ
people, and people buy the products produced by these firms.”48  In
an attempt to obfuscate the distinction between polluters and pol-
lutees, they conclude that “members of society pay abatement costs
and members of society bear the costs of unabated emissions,” with
the obvious implication that the two groups are the same.  In fact,
they are not.  Not all members of society are equal owners in pollut-
ing firms, nor do all members of society equally consume the products
of polluting firms.  The distinction between polluting firms (and their
owners and consumers) and the members of society that bear the cost
of residual pollution is important, even if there is some overlap be-
tween the two sets of individuals.
For more useful comments on the issue of cost distributions de-
scribed by the taxonomy, we can look to Mr. Keohane’s observations.
First, he notes that the “payments by polluters do not represent com-
pensation to the victims of pollution.”49  This is true if the damages
from pollution are borne by a subset of society (which is generally the
case), while the revenues from taxes or auctions are recycled to the
government coffers (an explicit assumption of the taxonomy).  In this
sense, the compensation is imperfectly aligned with the burden of re-
sidual pollution costs.  It is, however, the case that a system under
which polluters not only bear the costs of their abatement, but also
make payments to society for the damages associated with their un-
abated pollution, is more consistent with the polluter-pays-principle
(one fairness principle), than a system in which no such compensation
to society takes place.
48. A.H. Barnett & Timothy Terrell, Comment, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument
Choice:  Another View, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 415, 421-22 (2000).
49. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 394.
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Figure 1: Taxes, subsidies, and transfers
Second, Mr. Keohane points out that only in special cases (con-
stant marginal damages) will the payment from industry equal the
cost of residual pollution damages.50  This observation can be ex-
tended by symmetry to the case of subsidies and contracts, where
payments to abaters will exceed the cost of abatement except in the
case of constant marginal costs of abatement.  This means that, in the
case of subsidies and contracts, government/society will bear the bur-
den of abatement costs, residual pollution costs, and a transfer to
abaters.  To see this, consider a modification of Mr. Keohane’s Figure
1,51 from which he observes that “total environmental damages are
given by the area of the triangle OAQ and total tax revenue by the
rectangle OPAQ”52 so “the tax payment from the regulated industry
will exceed the damages from pollution.”53  Similarly, in the case of
subsidies or contracts, the government will make payments of QABE
for abatement costs of only QAE.  Whether private parties are paying
for residual pollution costs in the case of zero-baseline taxes or auc-
tioned marketable allowances or the government is paying for abate-
ment costs in the case of subsidies or contracts, the payment includes
both a compensation for actual costs and a transfer from one party to
the other.
50. See id. at 395 & n. 13.
51. Id. at 395 (Table 1).
52. Id. at 395.
53. Id. at 394.
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C.  The Framework and Its Applicability
I should start this section with an admission and a mea culpa.
Professors Barnett and Terrell correctly point out a clear error in the
text54—namely, the statement suggesting there is a difference between
allocative efficiency and overall efficiency.55  This is obviously wrong.
The statement should have referred to production efficiency rather
than allocative efficiency.  The point is straight-forward.  Incentive-
based instruments quite clearly minimize the costs of abatement pro-
duction, the PC costs.  However, when the full range of costs is con-
sidered (i.e., when IC and TX are added to the calculus), incentive-
based instruments may no longer minimize total costs.  In fact, this
point is well illustrated by Barnett and Terrell’s reference to the
Hahn and Noll study56 suggesting “that command-and-control regula-
tions provide a least-cost strategy for achieving California emission
standards for sulfates in Los Angeles.”57  The rationale of developing
a new framework is to help identify the circumstances under which
some instruments may be preferable to another, based on overall
economic efficiency criteria.
Several of Barnett and Terrell’s comments were more puzzling.
For example, they suggest that the article “complain[s] that the tradi-
tional economic framework concentrates on production costs to the
exclusion of other relevant factors.”58  This seems odd, given that they
go on to state that “Richards himself notes, many economists address
issues related to transaction costs, public finance, double dividend ef-
54. See Barnett & Terrell, supra note 48, at 422.
55. See Richards, supra note 26, at 225.
56. See Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Designing a Market for Tradeable Emissions
Permits, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 119 (Wesley A. Magat ed., 1982).
57. Barnett & Terrell, supra note 48, at 423.
58. Id. at 419.  Part of the difficulty in understanding Barnett and Terrell’s statement is that
the alleged “complaining” (also referred to as “misleading...characterization,” id. at 416) that
the economics framework deals only with production costs cannot be found in the article.  It is
clearly not the case that economics deals only with production costs, as evidenced by my sugges-
tion that we include other economic costs, such as implementation costs (transaction costs) and
public finance impacts, when analyzing environmental policy instruments.  It is also difficult to
respond to their charge, because Barnett and Terrell never explicitly define what they mean by
the “economics framework.”  My statements regarding the inadequacy of many instrument
choice studies that deal only with production costs was not meant as an indictment of the field
of economics, but rather as a recognition of the fact that certain branches of economics have
heretofore been left out of the discussion of environmental policy instruments.  It does not fol-
low that a recognition that the instrument choice literature has tended to focus on production
costs implies that I view that the “economic framework” focuses only on production costs and is
thus lacking.
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fects, and legal and political constraints.”59  In fact, far from rejecting
the economic paradigm, the new instrument choice framework is an
attempt to integrate many areas of economics that previously have
been treated as largely unrelated and apply the economic insights to
environmental policy implementation.
Similarly, Barnett and Terrell complain that the article is based
upon an assumption of a welfare-seeking government agent, even as
they cite a list of outstanding papers that made the same assump-
tions.60  The nature of the new framework, like the analysis in those
papers, is clearly normative,61 limited to the question of which instru-
ment would be chosen by a welfare-maximizing government agent,
under various circumstances.
Turning to others commentators’ suggestions and criticisms, Pro-
fessor Cole made the legitimate observation that the impact of the
framework suffers because it does not provide a comparative applica-
tion to demonstrate the advantage of this new approach relative to
more standard approaches.62   Even in his question he contains the an-
swer: “[i]ncluding empirical applications would, of course, have made
an already sizable paper substantially longer.”63
What can be said, even in this short response, is that it was a
practical application, abatement of atmospheric carbon dioxide ac-
cumulation through large-scale carbon sequestration, that precipi-
tated development of the new framework.  Carbon sequestration
combines a multiplicity of characteristics—long time horizons, high
initial investments, potentially separate polluters and abaters, land
use and management controls, nonpoint source abatement, and po-
tentially millions of participants—that make it difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to apply traditional command-and-control or simple in-
centive-based instruments.  This framework helps to parse through
many of the challenges associated with implementing goals that in-
volve these atypical abatement processes.
Cole is, of course, correct.  A proposed new or modified ap-
proach to any problem is more instructive when supplemented with
examples, and I have tried to provide those, if only sporadically.  But
as to full-length, unifying applications, one of the messages of the
framework is that the instrument choice exercise requires a thorough
59. Id. at 418.
60. See id. at 419-20 & n. 15.
61. See Richards, supra note 26, at 226.
62. See Cole, supra note 1, at 294.
63. Id.
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understanding of the science, technology, markets, and institutions
relevant to the particular application.  In the more complex problems,
explication of all these aspects is a task unto itself.  Thus, the process
must be seen as an iterative one:  identification of a problem, attempt
to apply the existing framework, failure, development of a new
framework, attempt to apply the new framework, revision of new
framework, and so on.  The next step then will be to demonstrate this
framework’s applicability to at least one environmental problem and
then to modify the framework based on the lessons learned there.
Ultimately, if the new framework is truly generalizable, it will find
uses beyond the particular application that precipitated its develop-
ment.  That will be the test of its value.
In a related vein, Professors Shapiro and Glicksman observed
that the “actual benefit of the framework . . . is a function of how
readily decision-makers are able to compile the relative cost informa-
tion that the framework requires.”64  In fact, one of the purposes of
the framework was to help identify these very issues—what empirical
studies will be required for a deeper understanding of cost tradeoffs
in the instrument choice process?  But the framework is also a con-
ceptual tool intended to help both decision-makers and academics
think about the many issues implicated in policy implementation.
Even in a world of bounded rationality, decision-makers have impres-
sions of the magnitude of various costs.  The framework is intended
first to remind them about the important cost elements, and second to
help them think about how their best guesses about those elements
might change as they move along the continua of instruments de-
picted in Figure 3.65
Finally, the comments provide an interesting contrast between
Mr. Keohane’s assertion that transaction cost economics has little to
contribute to environmental policy66 and Professor Cole’s enthusiastic
observation that the application of New Institutional Economics to
questions of environmental instrument choice is a distinctive contri-
bution of the framework.67  Clearly this is a discussion that will not be
resolved in the space of these comments.  It is worth considering,
64. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 322.  Similarly, Professor Cole observes, “Em-
pirical applications would help to assess just how difficult or easy it would be to put dollar signs
on the various factors Richards’ framework incorporates.  If it turned out to be difficult, that
might militate in favor of more limited frameworks that incorporate fewer and most easily quan-
tified cost factors.” Cole, supra note 1, at 294-95.
65. See Richards, supra note 26, at 238 (Figure 3).
66. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 400-401.
67. See Cole, supra note 1, at 290.
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however, Mr. Keohane’s observation that the two examples described
in the article are about information revelation, not asset specificity.68
The regulatory analog to Mr. Keohane’s canonical hold-up
problem69 is a government agency that must induce a group of firms to
reduce polluting emissions.  There is an asymmetry of information
with respect to the technological options and costs of abatement, such
that the government believes that there is heterogeneity among pol-
luters with respect to the costs of abatement, but does not know who
the low-cost abaters are or what the costs of specific polluters will be.
Clearly, an incentive-based trading program that achieves an equi-
marginal outcome70 would be more cost-effective than a system of
uniform technology or performance standards.  This is consistent with
one of the goals of the government regulator.  But the government
regulator also operates in a political environment and will be tempted
to bend to pressure from interest groups.
Suppose an individual firm is contemplating an investment in
“over-abating” to generate salable allowances.  The firm must be
concerned with the safety of its abatement investments.  Whether it is
stated as an information revelation problem or an asset specificity
problem, the firm will be vulnerable in at least two ways.  First, the
regulator, having induced the low-cost abaters to invest, may impose
new conditions on trades, reducing the amount of trade that occurs,
and thus “expropriating” the investment in the form of excess abate-
ment.  This is similar to Mr. Keohane’s example, but does not require
that the regulator have information about any particular firms or their
investments.  It is an ex post change in rules that firms may anticipate.
Second, the firm may anticipate that a subset of regulated parties will
pressure the regulator to slacken the rules.  If the government gives in
to this political pressure, i.e., is not willing to bear the cost of its side
of the regulatory relation, then the value of the abatement investment
is reduced.  When the government cannot credibly commit to main-
taining the rules over time, the low cost abater may not invest in the
efficient abatement technology.  In this case, there may be little rea-
son for the government to make the effort to extend its program from
a performance-based or quota system to a full trading system.
The credible commitment problem is easily extended to the case
of subsidies.  In the example of carbon sequestration discussed above,
68. See Keohane, supra note 1, at 404-06.
69. See id. at 402-04.
70. An equimarginal outcome is one in which all polluters abate to the point where their
marginal costs of abatement are equal.
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the government may want to induce private investment in low cost
carbon sinks by subsidizing carbon capture—a process that spans
decades.  Private parties, realizing that they must first invest to estab-
lish carbon sink projects, will also understand that the government
may be tempted for reasons of politics, budgetary constraints, or
other programmatic uncertainties, to reduce or eliminate the subsidy.
The problem is that if the government cannot credibly commit to
maintain those payments over very long periods of time, private land
owners will be unwilling to make initial investments.  The govern-
ment may be forced to provide carbon sequestration through gov-
ernment production, i.e., planting on government land and acquiring
more land as needed to meet programmatic goals.  The hierarchical
solution is perhaps more expensive in terms of producing the abate-
ment (PC) itself but may be less expensive when governance costs
(IC) of credibly committing are considered.
III.  CONCLUSIONS
I am grateful for the exchange of ideas that has surrounded the
instrument choice framework article.  Reading and responding to the
commentators provided an opportunity to sharpen my own
understanding of the framework, its contributions, and its limitations.
I hope the discussion has done the same for readers.
Bear in mind that the framework is a synthetic, conceptual work.
It does not propose much in the way of new theory per se, though
several of the reviewers spotted helpful insights.  Rather, the work is
an attempt to integrate existing theory from environmental econom-
ics, public finance economics, New Institutional Economics, and law.
The result should be useful to decision-makers, analysts, and aca-
demics in organizing their own thoughts about the relative merits and
limitations of the many environmental policy instruments.
As is always the case with an undertaking of this nature, the pro-
cess of developing the framework is iterative.  Many of the excellent
comments discussed above will be incorporated directly as the
framework continues to develop.  For example, Mr. Keohane’s obser-
vation that the loci of regulation can be extended to include ambient
effects can be applied directly.  Some of the comments, particularly
related to the role of New Institutional Economics in the framework,
suggest that there are concepts that need to be expanded and ex-
plored in separate work.  Finally, there is clearly room for improve-
ment in the exposition of the framework.  I look forward to another
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iteration with these and other reviewers as the concepts develop and
their exposition improves.
The process is also iterative in a sense foreshadowed by Profes-
sor Cole’s comment.  Ultimately, the purpose of the new framework
is to help analyze real-world problems.  It is time to put the concepts
to the test.  For example, current work describing a mechanism to im-
plement a carbon sequestration program for the United States is
based on this framework.  Inevitably, attempts to apply this approach
will reveal additional opportunities to improve and expand the
framework.
Finally, the framework is interdisciplinary in nature.  It attempts
to meld concepts from economics and law, and to a lesser extent, sci-
ence and technology.  Such a task requires an open mind, a degree of
tolerance, and a real effort at communication.  My own rather motley
training and experience has convinced me that no single field has the
monopoly on truth.  This is not to suggest in any way that disciplinary
training is not important—far from it.  But many opportunities for
constructive exchange across disciplines are missed by rigid insistence
on disciplinary purity.  If the academic fields are truly to benefit from
each others’ insights, we must avoid the balkanization of the disci-
plines.  It is important to find both language and means of communi-
cation that are accessible across disciplines.  I am grateful to the Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum for its contribution to that ef-
fort.
